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Prisons, the Profit Motive and Other Challenges to Accountability

It has been argued that “accountability is the linchpin of the correctional system”
(Freiberg, 1999, p 120) and needs to be a central feature of any prison system. It is
here that care needs to be taken. Accountability in its modern manifestation has
become a largely technical and instrumental process, yet accountability for prison
policies and practices has an undeniable moral component that needs to be
addressed in order for public accountability to be meaningful within this domain.
In Australia, accountability for private prisons has emphasised performance
measures, contractual compliance and monitoring, and this has often led to poor
outcomes for prisoners and the Australian community more broadly. The rise of
the modern private prison brings new questions surrounding appropriate
approaches to accountability, some of which will be explored in this paper. In
order to consider the affect of private prisons on the Australian prison system, I
have drawn on Chomsky’s work on neoliberalism.
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Prisons, the Profit Motive and Other Challenges to Accountability

Prisons mean business.

They are large organisations. They consist of many paid staff, bricks and mortar,
beds, security devices, professional practitioners of ancillary services. They are
expensive to build. They are expensive to operate.

But they are easy to fill (White, 1999, p. 243).

Dostoevsky argued that a society should be judged not by how it treats its outstanding
citizens, but by how it treats its criminals. If Dostoevsky is right, and we are to judge
society on this basis, information must be made publicly available in order to form a
picture of our treatment of citizens we deem to be criminals1. This picture is essential to
ensure that governments, acting on behalf of society, are held accountable for decisions
regarding the treatment of criminals and responses to criminal behaviour. The exchange of
information becomes even more important when that information pertains to the closed and
isolated environment of the prison. However, information in and of itself is not enough. We
need a context in which to place that information and a framework in which to understand
and debate the issues surrounding a society’s decision to imprison some of its members. In
this paper I argue that public accountability is central to a democratic government’s ability
to exercise its powers of restraint and punishment. A technical or instrumental discharge of
such a responsibility is not enough, as the vulnerability of those incarcerated and the
invisibility of those who manage that incarceration, inscribe a moral dimension to the
accountability relationships that result.

The rise of the private prison, has added to the public accountability issues within the
prison sector. Although businesses have been involved in the administration of punishment
throughout history, the shift to state administered punishment was heralded as a way to
ensure equity, justice and humanity within the penal system (Morris and Rothman, 1995)2.
Over the last twenty years this has changed significantly with the emergence of a
contemporary, private, ‘for-profit’ prison industry, providing diverse services, including
catering, medical care, employment training, court escort services, security, and prisons for
3

juveniles, people on remand, illegal immigrants, and adult offenders. This contemporary
transference of responsibility for prisons, from the public to the private sector, began in the
United States twenty years ago and is now commonplace in Britain and Australia, with the
latter holding about 17.8% of its incarcerated population in privately owned and/or
operated prisons3 (Private Prison Report International May 2003; Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2004; Roth, 2004). This transformation has also signified changes in
accountability relationships between the community, the government and the private prison
operator that are only beginning to be investigated.

This paper will consider some of these issues, paying particular attention to the
privatisation of prisons in Australia, but first it is important to consider what I mean by
accountability within this work.

Accountability: Its Technical and Moral Dimensions

Accountability is notoriously difficult to define (Cousins & Sikka, 1993; Sinclair, 1995).
Although few would argue against the proposition that accountability involves the giving
and/or receiving of an account of an event (Mulgan, 2000), there are many who argue that
this is not all that it entails (Sinclair, 1995; Shearer, 2002). Even though many accounting
researchers are recognising that accountability has broader, more nebulous implications
and possibilities, the more commonplace expectations do play an important role. The
giving and receiving of accounts of events for which we have an interest or a responsibility
has a number of important features; the account must be offered to an external source; it
enables debate as the giving or receiving of an account should allow for clarification,
scrutiny and revision; and it reinforces the idea that a broader social group may have rights
to an account of an event for which they are not directly in control (Mulgan, 2000).

One of the problems associated with this interpretation of accountability is that in order to
discharge the requirement to be accountable, both the private and public sector have come
to rely heavily on approaches that are technical, measurable and procedural - which may
have the effect of limiting our expectations of what a public or private enterprise should be
accountable for (Nelson, 1993; Shearer, 2002). Nelson (1993) has argued that the technical
emphasis that has come to dominate our understanding of accountability, particularly
within the public sector, configures it as procedural, rather than dynamic, denying its
4

ethical influences and dimensions. These are evidenced by the increasing reliance on
performance measures (Robinson, 2003), financial reports (Stanton, 1997), limited audit
investigations (English, 2003) and political debate that centres on a statistical or numerical
discussion of events (Rose, 1991). In regard to accounting, Arrington has argued that
“accounting just assumes its sovereignty over the moral, assumes its right to hold all
accountable to its ridiculous telos – money” (1999, p.1). Dillard and Ruchala (2005) have
taken this argument further, raising the idea that a technical or hierarchical approach to
accountability has enabled “administrative evil” in which a social actor is disconnected
from the moral community through technical processes. They claim that
(o)vercoming administrative evil can occur only as a reconnection of the
instrumental and the moral is undertaken through a reintegration of socializing and
hierarchical accountability systems (Dillard and Ruchala, 2005, p.619).

So, although accountability has often been interpreted to be a largely procedural and
technical exchange of information between interested parties that fulfils a broader social,
political and economic need within societies that make claims to democracy - increasingly,
accountability is being recognised as a discourse (Nelson, 1993; Sinclair, 1995). Discourses
of accountability play a role in constituting our beliefs about who, what and how accounts
of events are to be given and received (Roberts, 1991). It is constantly being renegotiated
(often unequally) and it always encompasses the possibility of challenge (Roberts, 1991).
The paper represents a contribution to the challenges that are already emerging within the
accounting literature to the dominance of technical and procedural dimensions of
accountability over its important moral and ethical implications (Broadbent, Dietrich and
Laughlin, 1996; Shearer, 2002; Funnell, 2003; Dillard and Ruchala, 2005). Shearer (2002),
in particular, emphasises the need to redefine accountability beyond the narrow
requirements of economic entities within market economies. She says that it is “moral
responsibility that grounds the accountability of the entity with respect to this community”
(2002, p.543) and she called for
(a) discourse of human identity that is irreducibly distinct from economic man, and
it must be capable of infusing our self-understanding as economic subjects with a
moral obligation that exceeds our own self-interest (Shearer, 2002, p.569).
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Shearer’s (2002) call for a deeper appreciation of who we are as ethical (as well as
economic) beings is indicative of a growing interest in an expanded understanding of what
constitutes accountability. It also suggests ways that we can avoid being trapped by an
already present discourse that emphasises accountability in limited, often economic, terms
and is supported by Lehman’s (2005, pg. 976) call for a framework that “contextualised
accountability within a substantive moral framework”. This is particularly important within
the context of public accountability for privately operated prisons, as ethics and morality
should not be divorced from debates about incarceration and the management of such
facilities.

The discussion that follows seeks to expose how the Australian government has come to
define public accountability for private prisons in limited terms, focusing largely on cost
effectiveness rather than service quality. This approach has also emphasised specific
performance requirements; it has disengaged debate from the purpose and intent of
incarceration; and broader issues of accountability that link a community of citizens to its
responses to criminal behaviour have all but disappeared. This is the real purpose of public
accountability and the provision of information that narrows this scope to such things as the
number of drug tests, or the number of violent incidents within a prison distracts us from
examining the deeper issues that arise from a social choice to incarcerate criminals –
particularly within the confines of privately operated, profit oriented, prisons. Within the
current political climate, the discharge of this responsibility has emphasised the technical
and procedural dimensions of accountability. However, even this has been hard to achieve.
As will be shown, this effaces the significant moral and ethical aspects of the
accountability relationships between the private operator and the government; the
government and citizens and ultimately, our society and how it treats people we deem to be
‘criminal’.

Pushing Prison Privatisation
In state capitalist democracies, the public arena has been extended and enriched by
long and bitter popular struggle. Meanwhile concentrated private power has
labored to restrict it. The conflicts form a good part of modern history. The most
effective way to restrict democracy is to transfer decision making from the public
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arena to unaccountable institutions: kings and princes, priestly castes, military
juntas, party dictatorships, or modern corporations (Chomsky, 1999, p.132).

Generally, it has been argued that outsourcing and privatisation have benefits that include
the ability for the government to shop around for vendors in order to choose the quality and
quantity of services required. It has also been suggested that outsourcing will invite
competition, giving the government choices between innovative, lean, less expensive
service providers (Dixon et al, 1996; Shaoul, 1997; Taylor & Warrack, 1998). There are a
number of corresponding concerns, including the fact that competition may not be easily
stimulated or may not suit the industry in question (for example, defence industry
contractors are highly specialised and secretive, two qualities that do not suit a competitive
market; and in Australia there had been three companies bidding for private prison
contracts in the early stages of privatisation); there have also been many examples of bad
contracts (Funnell, 2001)4; there is a danger of excessive dependence on a particular
service provider; and perhaps most importantly, the full costs of the process are rarely
calculated (for example, the cost to the community of eroding job security; the retraction of
state obligations to its citizens; and the cost of reversing the decision if it turns out to be a
bad one) (Gormley, 1991; Butler, 1991). Although couched in neoliberal terms, the case for
private prison cost-effectiveness remains ambiguous and evidence from innumerable
studies have revealed contradictory outcomes (Logan, 1990; McDonald, 1990; Kirby et al,
2000; Cooper and Williams, 2005). Most recently NSW Parliament’s inquiry into the
‘Value for Money for NSW Correctional Centres’ (2005) found that no definitive
conclusion could be drawn on the cost-effectiveness of private prisons because the
uniqueness of each prison (such as size, mixture of prisoners, responsibility, programs,
building design, services) doesn’t enable a meaningful comparison.

The lack of definitive information about outsourcing decisions would suggest that it cannot
be separated from ideological, political, economic or ethical influences (Ryan & Ward,
1989; Chomsky, 1999). Cooper and Williams (2005) argued financial representations of
cost savings used to initiate discussions about prison privatization, are in and of themselves
hypothetical. This hypothetical data has been used as though it is ‘real’ in order to
legitimise the privatisation agenda and when the assumptions that underpinned the data
were explored it became obvious that many alternative conclusions could be drawn. For
instance, they point out that the Scottish Executive’s proposal to ‘cost’ prison services
7

treated the current Scottish incarceration trends as “inexorable and failed to consider
alternatives to custody” (Cooper and Williams, 2005, p.499).

Incarceration has a variety of different public policy objectives and justifications (such as
deterrence, reform, incapacitation and/or classification) and imprisonment also has
unintended consequences and effects a person in more ways than those anticipated by the
State. Amongst other things, it means that a member of society is restrained and loses their
freedom; their life path is interrupted; their family and social relations become difficult to
maintain; there is a reduction in civil liberties such as privacy; they are held in places that
are frequently charged with an atmosphere of distrust and violence; they are often
surrounded by drugs and drug deals; and their lives often become lonely, idle and
unstimulated. In this vein Davis argued that the “prison industrial system materially and
morally impoverishes its inhabitants and devours the social wealth needed to address the
very problems that have led to spiralling numbers of prisoners” (1998). This places an
inescapable moral responsibility on society to ensure that there are clear objectives
associated with incarceration; that imprisonment meets these broader social objectives; and
that prisons operate in a socially acceptable manner. Fundamentally, a society holds a
‘criminal’ accountable for their actions and that person has a corresponding right to an
accountable execution of the objectives of their sentence. This is predicated on the
assumption that all of these can be negotiated meaningfully and democratically. It is also
complicated by the fact that some private entities can now profit from incarceration and
that these entities have a vested interest in the maintenance, if not the expansion of
incarceration as a response to criminal behaviour. It has led some to ask whether there are
“services that are “inherently governmental” and should thus be quarantined from the
process [of contracting out]?” (Schoombee, 1997, p.141). This has raised discussion about
how to reconfigure accountability within this context (Funnell, 2003; Dillard and Ruchala,
2005)

Not only are the public policy objectives diverse, but also the level of privatisation vary
considerably. As many peripheral services that are integral to the operation of a public
prison are now purchased from private contactors, including employment advice/training,
garbage collection, energy and water/sewerage services, boundaries between the public and
the private sector are blurred. This complicates accountability arrangements and makes it
more difficult to justify the place of the public sector within such an environment, a
8

situation that has been capitalised on by private operators who argue they are just providing
cheaper services, whilst distancing themselves from the significance of those services to
the community. This is a point presented by many scholars in the field, such as Harding
who has argued that
(t)he key point, whatever degree or model of privatisation is adopted, is that the
allocation of punishment should remain with the state apparatus, whilst the day to
day administration of that punishment is devolved to the contract managers (1992,
p.2).

Harding’s (1992) point of view would suggest that a clear distinction between sentencing
and the administration of that sentence could be drawn. Such a distinction is not necessarily
as easy or as desirable as this suggests. As the State has the power to deprive a person of
their liberty, it is critical the administration of that sentence is subject to an appropriate
standard of care, that human rights are observed and the actions of those vested with the
control over the detainees should be closely scrutinised and monitored. The further this task
moves away from the State the more difficult it is to monitor and the State has more
opportunity to retreat from its responsibility to ensure such conditions. Moyle has argued
“(i)t should be emphasised that prison regimes, and the powers exercised by those who
manage them, involve a continuation of sovereign power” (1999, p.154) and that there is a
need to identify the “the powers that may not be delegatable within a democracy” (1999.
p.155).

The delegation of these powers may well be strategic, providing benefits to both the state
and the private sector. Chomsky (1996; 1999) has argued that the current capitalist order
undermines democracy, and within this context public debate has diminished. This is a
view that is supported by Munck (2005, p.65) when he wrote that it “is government
intervention in economic life that threatens freedom, according to the neoliberal theorists”.
As corporations gain control of more and more of the institutions and services traditionally
maintained by government (such as prisons), private power has been enhanced. As such,
formal electoral democracy helps to maintain the illusion of democracy, and that the
“population has been diverted from the information and public forums necessary for
meaningful participation in decision making” (McChesney, 1998, p. 9). As McChesney
wrote
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(n)eoliberalism5 is the defining political economic paradigm of our time – it refers to
the policies and processes whereby a relative handful of private interests are permitted
to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximise their personal profit
(McChesney,1998, p. 7).

This has often been characterized as a logical and appropriate response to governments
who have been painted as “incompetent, bureaucratic and parasitic” (McChesney, 1998,
p.7). On the other hand the free market is assumed to “encourage private enterprise and
consumer choice, reward personal responsibility and entrepreneurial initiative”
(McChesney, 1998, p.7) even though there is little empirical evidence to support this claim.
Contrary to the rhetoric of neoliberalism, Chomsky (1999) points out that governments
have not reduced in size, and there is little evidence to suggest that privatised public assets
have increased in efficiency and/or quality. The ideology that underpins neoliberalism has
contributed to the rise of private prisons, and with this privatisation a number of questions
need to be raised about the nature, appropriateness and maintenance of public
accountability within a prison system that is increasingly profit oriented.

Investigations such as this one, need to be placed within the context of neoliberalism, in
order to shed light on the ways that we organise our societies and to problematise the
privatisation of prisons on both technical and moral grounds (see Russell, 1997). This
argument hinges on the idea that ‘neoliberal’ governments serve the interests of capital and
its impulse to continually accumulate, whilst enabling a retreat from any substantive public
accountability.. As Puxty (1997) has argued, when capitalism is in crisis, capital needs to
expand into new areas, which may lead to a changed role of the state as it releases areas it
has traditionally controlled to the private sector and “capitalism tries to turn all
relationships into a commercial exchange” (Hutton and Giddens, 2001, p.17). In this vein,
private prisons serve both the interests of government and private enterprise. Private
prisons may help disguise the impact of global capitalism on people (through job losses,
failure to provide productive work and ‘imprisoning’ the products of political and
economic alienation), it appears to shift the responsibility for prisons to the private sector
and it enables private interests to profit in a new way. As a result it diminishes the public
sphere, and changes the nature of public accountability (Chomsky, 1999; Funnell, 2003). In
support of this Chomsky wrote that
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(d)emocracy is under attack worldwide, including the leading industrial countries; at
least, democracy in a meaningful sense of the term, involving opportunities for
people to manage their own collective and individual affairs. Something similar is
true of markets. The assaults on democracy and markets are furthermore related.
Their roots lie in the power of corporate entities that are increasingly interlinked and
reliant on powerful states, and largely unaccountable to the public (1999, p.92).

The changing relationships between the private and the public sector referred to by
Chomsky (1999) have impacted significantly on discourses of accountability. The current
arrangements for incarceration in Australia testify to this. It is now possible that a private,
for profit, company to be accountable to the government for the delivery of prison services
and facilities and the government is then accountable to the public (including prisoners) for
the delivery of these services – in so doing, distance is placed between the service provider
and the community in a way that would present significant challenges to fulfilling any
technical, let alone moral, accountability function. In an attempt to address this, or further
reinforce it, private prison operators present largely technical accounts of events and are
accountable for the delivery of certain services at a certain quality against performance
indicators (Robinson, 2003); the government is able to report on these in a relatively
objective manner and also distance themselves from direct responsibility; and at the same
time, questions about the ethical and moral responsibility of government and society to
these citizens is almost entirely eradicated from debate.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that there is a problem with framing the debate
within the private/public sector dichotomy, and considering accountability issues within
this framework, as it can often fail to investigate the ‘subject’ that is being debated (Cooper
and Williams, 2005). This is in itself an emasculated view of accountability, because it
does not consider critically what to do in circumstances in which both the private and the
public sector have failed to provide a solution to the crisis of the current prison system.
This delineates the debate within the parameters of who should provide the prison, rather
than whether the prison is a solution to the social issues that our societies face. This may
make it easier to ignore and silence debate about the definitions and causes of criminal
behaviour, such as social alienation, economic inequity and institutionalised discrimination.
As accountability plays an important role in our ability to make decisions, the nature of the
information is vital. It should not be limited to information that allows us to compare the
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public to the private sector on the basis of cost, but rather it should enable an investigation
into the purpose and possibilities of addressing the social issues that lead to crime and not
just what we do with ‘the criminal’ afterwards.

Private Prisons in Australia
(A) private corporation is not in the business of being humanitarian. It’s in the
business of increasing profit and market share. Doing that typically is extremely
harmful to the general population. It may make some number look good
(Chomsky, 1996, p. 122).

Since 1988, the private sector has played an expanding role in the operation of Australia’s
correctional facilities. This was sparked by the Kennedy Report (1988) for the Queensland
Corrective Services Commission into correctional reform recommended that a private
operator under contract to the Commission should develop one prison. This was based on
its findings that problems within the existing system could be solved through privatisation,
including staffing difficulties, creating a market for corrective institutions, increased
flexibility in correctional arrangements, and developing competition in order to have
something to test performance and costs against. This argument had been presented in other
countries previously, and it is widely accepted within the literature on private prisons that
the fundamental motivations of prison privatisation have been the belief that private prisons
will reduce operating costs (largely through reduced labour costs), provide faster and
cheaper prison capacity (limited barriers to financing and construction) and that they
should improve the quality of the service (through innovation) (Logan, 1990; Calabrese,
1993; Shichor, 1995). Although these arguments have been presented as neutral
representations of the issues, the arguments are not sterile or politically neutral. Ideological
assumptions underpinned the Kennedy Report, including the appeal to ‘the market’ to solve
persistent failures within the prison sector; the representation of the unionised workforce as
‘difficult’ and ‘problematic’, in part because of their refusal to accept further compromised
work conditions; the appeal to ‘flexibility’ as though this will have no affect on quality or
performance and that this flexibility does not come at a cost (such as people’s jobs or job
security, working hours and so on); and the presumption that competition will enable
performance to be measured more accurately on the basis of cost, which may have scaled
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back attempts to develop other ways of critiquing and improving punishment and prison
services (Chan, 1994; Moyle, 1999).

This would suggest that the decision to privatise prisons was not one based purely on
technical information; rather, it was a highly politicised move surrounding a need to
disassociate the government from the prevailing problems within prisons. Although these
motivations were raised within the media and there was some public debate over the
government’s approach, the report was accepted. This led the Commission to call for
tenders to manage and operate Borallon Correctional Centre, which was a 240-bed medium
security prison near Brisbane. Corrections Corporation Australia (CCA) was awarded this
contract in 1989, and under this three-year contract, the first private prison in Australia was
opened in 1991 at a cost of $22 million to build, and a contract fee of $9.7 million for the
1991 financial year (Harding, 1992). This contract was awarded partly as a result of the
lobbying efforts of Senior Executives from CCA who travelled around Australia in 1989
‘informing’ State governments of the benefits of private prisons (Gow and Williamson,
1998).

Subsequently contracts have been awarded to private prison operators throughout the
country and today Australia has 7 privately operated adult prisons operating in 5 states.
These are run by three companies, all of which are foreign owned – Australian Integrated
Management Services (a wholly owned subsidiary of the US company Sodexho Alliance),
GEO Group (previously known as Australian Correctional Management), Management and
Training Corporation (who’s corporate headquarters are in Utah) and GSL Custodial
Services (formerly Group 4 Falck). Information about each of these prisons is presented in
the following table

[Table 1: Insert here]

From the Kennedy Report onwards, the possibility that private companies could play a role
in the provision of correctional institutions throughout Australia was firmly entrenched.
Running a prison brings with it significant responsibilities. The foremost of these
responsibilities is prisoner health, safety and dignity, all of which are prioritised under the
Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia 1996 and the UN Standard Minimum
Rules for Treatment of Prisoners. Public prisons are notoriously bad at providing safe and
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dignified conditions for their inmates, which has meant that arguments suggesting that
public prisons are more able to meet these qualitative outcomes than private prisons have
been difficult to mount. However, there is significant evidence that suggests the pursuit of
profit has exaggerated the erosion of the quality of services and conditions being provided
to prisoners and the community as a whole. A study conducted by Biles and Dalton found
that
Port Phillip prison, Deer Park and Arthur Gorrie all have higher rates for all
deaths and suicides than the Australian average (1999, p.4, see table).

Although some of the findings of Biles and Dalton (1999) are alarming, the reports
significance does not just lie in what it reveals about the performance of these prisons. Its
significance also lies in what it reveals about the inability for a community to affect
change, express outrage, demand greater scrutiny and ensure better outcomes for their
community and the prison system as a whole. As prison institutions have struggled to
maintain legitimacy as a form of punishment that has positive outcomes for the ‘punished’
and society in general, the introduction of the profit motive into this arena raises further
concern (Cavise, 1998). Cavise has argued that
(w)ith private control, there is a danger that prisoners, traditionally among
society’s most neglected members, will suffer abuse and exploitation for profit
(1998, p.22).

It certainly makes the relationship between the community and the service provider one
that is dependent on the community’s ability to monitor and access information about
prisons. In the words of Harding:
The question of effective accountability thus becomes central (Harding, 1992,
p.2).

Much of the literature concerning the debate over the contracting out of government
services suggests that accountability can be ensured through a carefully constructed
contract and appropriate monitoring arrangements (Harding, 1992; McDonald, 1994;
Steane and Walker, 2000). This presents a very technical face of accountability, which is
not unusual within the context of societies that privilege technical approaches to social
14

negotiations and is closely linked to a neoliberal framework (Bryan, 2000). Although there
is a technical dimension to accountability this is often given a disproportionate
representation within the literature and may have the affect of constructing rather than
representing, notions of accountability “by rendering selectively visible, relations of
accountability” (Power, 1991, p.38). Steane and Walker have argued that the dominant
discourses in which this view of accountability is placed, “concerns the application of
economic logic to issues previously within the domain of political scientists and public
policy theorists” (2000, p.248; Chomsky, 1999). This is indicative of the systemic divorce
of economic and social policy, as though one can be justified through the other, rather than
equally important components of social organisation.

At the least, the accountability process should reveal whether the contracted private
operator is fulfilling its contract and providing the service that has been agreed upon, but
according to Bates
(a)fter 15 years of privatization, officials still have almost no reliable data to
assess whether for profit prisons are doing their job – or living up to their promise
to save taxpayers money (1999, p.22).

In order to unravel some of the issues surrounding the public accountability of private
prisons, the remainder of this paper will look at both its procedural and ethical
manifestations discussed in an earlier section, illustrating how inadequate the current
arrangements have been in achieving either. It should be noted that any attempt to deal with
the procedural and the ethical dimensions of accountability separately presents problems.
The failings of technical accountability enable discussion of the importance the ethical
dimensions of accountability. Inevitably, these discussions are intertwined.

Procedural Accountability and Prison Profits
The term ‘accountability’ is used in this context to mean more a ‘technical’ than a
‘moral’ responsibility and it is considered to be an objective and measurable
concept rather than a subjective one (Shichor, 1998, p.90).

Although it is increasingly accepted that accountability has a moral and ethical dimension
(Burrrit & Lehman, 1995; Sinclair, 1995; Shichor, 1998; Hill et al, 2001; Shearer, 2002;
15

English 2003), even its technical components are difficult to ensure. When applied to
private prisons, ensuring even the most basic, commonplace forms of accountability has
been problematic. There have been difficulties ensuring access to quality information; it
has been hard to ensure financial accountability because of the ways that contract fees have
been structured; it has been difficult to monitor contract performance; and the processes of
contract awarding, renewal and termination have presented difficulties that undermine the
ability of the community to ensure public accountability.

I. Access to Quality Information
If accountability is central to the concept of responsible government and
knowledge of the activities of government is central to the exercise of a citizen’s
control over government then it is clear that the doctrine of commercial
confidentiality can operate as a barrier to the availability of information (Freiberg,
1999, p. 121).

For the procedural functions of accountability to be satisfied there must be access to
information that facilitates necessary scrutiny. This is essential in order to ensure that social
institutions are constantly under review and challenged to improve the quality of their
services. Along with the important dimension of access is the need for quality information
that gives detailed, accurate, comparable data – a mission that most accountants are fully
aware of. Unfortunately, in the case of prison privatisation this access has been hindered by
a number of things, namely, the government’s ability to deem certain information
‘commercial in confidence’; the information has often been technical and hasn’t
necessarily provided significant insight; often the information has not been reported in a
timely manner; and some sources of information (such as prisoners) have been harder to
access under privatisation.

In Australia, many core documents relating to prison privatisation have been held back
from public scrutiny under the guise of ‘commercial confidentiality’, stalling many
attempts to scrutinise the operations of both state and private prisons because of a “lack of
access to what seemed to be key documentation” (Harding, 1998, p.5; Funnell, 2003). This
is a position supported by Gow and Williamson (1998) in there analysis of Australia’s
historical development from a penal colony to what they describe as a ‘corporate colony’ in
16

which public access to information is secondary to a corporations desire for secrecy.
Although some information about private prisons has been made available through
Freedom of Information6 claims, this is costly, time consuming and often vital information
is censored before release. The other main source of public information on privately
managed prisons has been provided through audit reports of the prisons, and official
investigations into prison operations such as the State Government of Victoria’s
Audit Review of Government Contracts (2000); the annual Productivity Commissions
Report on Government Services; and specially commissioned reports such as the Victorian
Correctional Service’s Report on the Metropolitan Women’s Correctional Centre’s
Compliance with Contractual Obligations and Prison Services Agreement (Armytage,
2000) and the Report of the Independent Investigation into the Management and
Operations of Victoria’s Private Prisons (Kirby et al, 2000). Although these have value,
they are limited and constrained by the framework in which they operate and often
reinforce the current arrangements. The scopes of these investigations are often limited and
most have focused on efficiency improvements, financial expenditures and performance
against set measures. Appraisals that adopt a broader evaluative stance are not
commonplace and are more likely the result of investigative journalism than any officially
sanctioned system of accountability.

A second issue that inhibits the ability to ensure effective accountability in this
environment relates to the quality of that information. Information about the quality of the
services has often been limited to that which is easily counted, such as the number of
escape attempts, positive drug tests, or ‘incidents’. Audit reports and special reports
commissioned by State Government’s into the activities of private prisons, like those
mentioned previously, have also focused on these issues. These have considerable
problems because of the ability to manipulate the data. It is also questionable whether this
data can shed light on the quality of the service being provided, and whether it provides
enough information on which to evaluate and review approaches to justice and punishment.
Unfortunately, a strict liberal framework may “perpetuate the status quo by simply
providing additional information to stakeholders without critically investigating” (Lehman,
1999, p.218) the issues that are in question. It is here that this technical mutation of
accountability becomes problematic because it is
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potentially constructing, by virtue of rendering selectively visible, relationship of
accountability; an inversion of the traditional view of the sources of accountability
(Power, 1991, p.39).

The problems associated with access to information were highlighted in the Correctional
Services Commissioner’s Report on the Metropolitan Women’s Correctional Centre’s
(MWCC) (Armytage, 2000) compliance with its contractual obligations and prison services
agreement. A lot of the issues raised here were not visible in the reports required under the
contract and were only made apparent through detailed investigations and not through the
standard accountability arrangements. By way of a specific example, the contract requires
that the prison operator report drug related incidents to the Commissioner.
The contract also required that no more than 8.26% of Prisoners test positive for nonprescribed drug use, as a result of random testing (Contract for the Management of
Metropolitan Women’s Correctional Centre, 1995, p. 171). This accounted for 20% of the
Corrections Corporation Australia’s (CCA) performance related fee (Armytage, 2000).
Should this target be breached then the fee would be reduced by the proportion established
within the contract. Ideally, the emphasis placed on these kinds of performance outcomes
should improve the performance of the service. However, the emphasis can also mean that
steps are taken to ensure that the outcomes are met ‘technically’ without actually
improving performance. For instance, the Commissioner’s investigation into the MWCC
found that
for the last 3 months, prisoner ‘E’ has been tested on 13 occasions between
4.00am and 5.20am. The MWCC Manager Health Services has advised OCSC
there is no medical reason as to why prisoner ‘E’ has to be tested at these times.
The testing of prisoner ‘E’ at these times is of significant concern as the
predictability of testing enables the prisoner to use drugs with a decreased
likelihood of being detected (Armytage, 2000, p.16).

This is an example of how the measurement criteria can be manipulated in order to meet
contractual requirements. Such distortions of ‘success’ are inevitable when the criteria for
measurement are as limited as the number of positive drug tests, and that these criteria are
contingent on the continuity of the contract and the financial viability of the private
contractor. Many of the issues that led to default notices being issued to the contractor
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related to the management decision not to report required information in a timely manner.
As any meaningful system of accountability requires the exchange of information, these
breaches undermine the ability of the government to ensure the private contractor is held
accountable and also undermines the ability of the public to hold the government
accountable for its actions. The Auditor General of Victoria’s Report on Ministerial
Portfolio’s (2001) identified a number of key issues that related to Victoria’s private
prisons operators failing to report information. They found that significant incidents were
not “immediately reported” (2001, s3.4.39) and many incidents were “not declared at the
earliest opportunity” (2001, s.3.4.40), undermining the most basic dimension of
accountability.

Although some audit reports and special investigations into private prisons have provided
insight into the management of the private prisons, this has been limited by a number of
factors that are unique to the new private arrangements. For instance, traditionally,
prisoners have been a good source of information about what is actually occurring within a
prison and their access to people outside the prison has played an important accountability
function (Maguire et al, 1985). According to Gow and Williamson (1998), in Victoria
private prison regulation has ensured the censoring and silencing of prisoners, wherein
prisoners have to pre-record eight phone numbers, calling the media is banned and all
phone calls are recorded. This has meant that there has been a decrease in the amount of
information about what happens inside prisons from the point of view of the actual
prisoners. The report into MWCC (Armytage, 2000) found similar problems, with
inadequate staffing leading to long lock-down periods, which make it impossible for
prisoners to access telephones or meet with family and friends. This draws into question
the argument that more flexible staffing arrangements made possible through private prison
operators are actually lead to more successful prisons.

In order for basic accountability this to be satisfied access to information needs to be
ensured, and in a profit-oriented environment, this may be even harder to guarantee. Rather
than ensuring that private contractors perform well, these examples suggest that there is a
large incentive to ensure that the private contractor appears to be performing well. As
Shichor has argued, evaluating private prison performance is hard because “of the paucity
of benchmark data to forecast future developments”, the “problems of access to the records
of private companies” and the difficulty of providing an evaluation of private operators
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when “there is already an assumption that they are doing a better job than state run prisons”
(1998, p. 89). There is significant evidence to suggest that private prison operators are not
providing the government with even the most basic, contractually required information
within the defined time frames. As such, access to quality information that enables scrutiny
of private prisons by the government becomes very difficult and just as importantly, the
lack of publicly available information makes it almost impossible for member of the
broader community to scrutinise the activities of the prison operators. A corresponding
problem arises, in that the energies of the interested parties become focused narrowly on
achieving basic information exchanges, and questions about what constitutes that
information, and who has a right to it become marginalised by the pressing need to ensure
the basic requirements (as defined by the contract) are met. In light of this, even this
procedural element of the accountability arrangements between the prison contractor and
the government has been hard to ensure.

II. Contractual Fees: How to Make a Profit, Prison Style
What has happened is the privatisation of profit and the socialisation of risk (Scott,
1996, p.101)

As a result of the commercial confidentiality powers of governments, very little contract
information has been released. By mid 2004, contracts for private prisons in Victoria and
Western Australian were publicly available, however, all other states have not released the
contracts to the public. Importantly, the financial information within these contracts has not
been made publicly available, so public scrutiny of the financial arrangements has only
been possible through secondary sources.

Fees awarded for private prison management contracts differ from state to state and prison
to prison. There are obvious reasons for the differences in payment, including the different
mix of inmates in the prison, the different level of services provided, or the agreed
differences in efficiency, running costs and profit margins for the operators. When
analysing these costs, the Auditor-General (1999) could not release the benchmarks for
government operating costs, but could say that all contracts were less than the
government’s benchmarks and that even so, he was unsure about the cost savings because
of the inability to factor in things like long-term social costs, societal risks and monitoring
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cost ‘realities’. In terms of accountability, the contracts provide little information about
how much the fee will be reduced in the case of breaches, which is essential in order to
understand how the firm is encouraged financially to comply with the contract. There is
also little information about how the corporation can make a profit and what actions they
can take in order to pursue this aim.

Generally the fees associated with a prison contract have been divided into three parts.
There is an accommodation service charge, which is for the provision of physical facilities;
a correctional services fee, which is for the day-to-day operations of the prison; and a
performance-linked fee, representing the investment reward or profit. It is the latter that
distinguishes the private operator from the government. It is a fee that should encourage
quality service delivery because it enables the operator to make a profit. However, this fee
has often led to an erosion of reporting quality rather than an increase in service. The
following section will offer some examples of how this fee structure has not enhanced the
accountability framework, financially or in terms of service quality.

Firstly, the accommodation service charge appears to be a simple fee for service payment,
but has proven to be quite controversial. For example, the Australian Broadcasting
Commission (Mares, 2000) reported that charities may have inadvertently contributed to
ACM’s bottom line. ACM’s contract requires it to ensure that there is adequate clothing for
the detainees and prisoners, but it puts no limits on how they can source and finance these
needs. According to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s report, ACM initially
sourced clothes from St Vincent de Paul, who agreed to provide them at $5 per kilogram
(their normal rate was $8). Eventually it was discovered that ACM managed to source the
clothes from another section of St Vincent de Paul for free. When ACM was confronted by
St Vincent de Paul, they ended up paying $2,100 for 2,000 kilograms of clothes for which
they originally had negotiated a rate of $5 per kilogram. When this information came to
light, the commercial relations between St Vincent de Paul and ACM broke down, so ACM
went to the Uniting Church and asked for clothes and basic housing items to be provided
(such as curtains). According to the Uniting Church, there was no suggestion that they
would pay for these items. When the Uniting Church realised that “the government is
actually, on behalf of the Australian people, paying ACM to provide those things and we
decided then not to go ahead with it” (Mares, 22/11/2000). The situation exposed the fact
that the government had no way of holding the private operator accountable for how they
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provided the service. The outcome proved controversial as it allowed the private operator
the opportunity to exploit charitable organisations to fulfil its contractual requirements in
an attempt to maximise its profits. In this situation the use of private operators and the
claims that these operators can provide the services more cost effectively, has meant the
provider under the private system can be held less accountable than a government provider.

Secondly, the correctional services fee also appeared to be a straightforward payment, but
instead, it has proven quite controversial. For example, in January 2003, prison guards at
Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre were in dispute with ACM over a plan to use prison
labour to increase prison profits (Private Prison Report International, May 2003). The
proposal involved replacing prison staff with inmates in areas such as the kitchen.
Although ACM was paid a fee to provide for the day-to-day management of the centre, this
proposal didn’t appear to contravene the contract as the contract had not defined how the
services should be provided. After protracted negotiations with unions, the proposal was
dropped. This presented a similar dilemma to that outlined previously, the mode of delivery
was left out of the contract to enable ‘flexibility’ but instead could be interpreted as
allowing the company access to exploitative practices to maximise returns. There was no
formal process that allowed the government and the community to hold the provider
accountable for how the service was to be delivered.

And finally, the performance linked fee was designed to enable the company to be paid a
fee that was above the costs of the operation based on them meeting certain specified
standards. Unfortunately, the performance incentive has often led to under reporting of
incidents, rather than excellence in service quality. For example the Woomera detention
centre provides graphic examples of the extent that corrections corporations will go to in
order to be ‘cost effective’ and ultimately generate a profit. In the case of Woomera, it
appeared that Australasian Correctional Management (ACM) failed to report ‘incidents’
that related to its performance evaluation. Such an incident received considerable media
attention when it was reported in 2000 that ACM failed to report an alleged rape of a 12year-old boy in their Woomera facility. It was also widely reported that they were reluctant
to disclose this information because it would lead to a financial penalty of around $20,000
(Nolan, 2000).
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This would suggest that the presence of a financial penalty and the corresponding effect
this would have on the profitability of the centre, meant that the accountability
arrangements written into the contract weren’t sufficient and may well have led to
opposing outcomes. For ACM to be held accountable if they breach their responsibilities to
care for refugees and keep them free from physical and sexual abuse, the government relies
on them to report incidents accurately. Conversely, to ensure a profit, the company has an
interest in ensuring reports do not expose them to a financial penalty.

Detailed information is important in order to understand how the profit motive is affecting
the provision of prison services and how ‘cost effectiveness’ is actually achieved. Without
this type of information financial accountability becomes emasculated and technical,
lacking any substantial information on which to assess performance. As few contracts are
available, and the costing remains secret in many cases, it forces the public to rely on
secondary sources. It becomes hard to scrutinise costs, let alone form a picture as to
whether the cost savings (if there are any) are morally defensible or are the result of
practices that are unacceptable to the community.

III. Contractual Monitoring
Richard Harding: To give an example, in Junee Prison, which is in New South
Wales, there was at one stage a riot, and this riot wasn’t even mentioned in the
annual report of the monitors about the prison. It was quite a major riot, and
obviously they didn’t quite conceive, or their superiors did not quite conceive
their role as dealing with the feel of what’s happening in the prison, the ethos,
they were more concerned with tick-a-box kind of monitoring (Haultain, 1997).

From a purely technical point of view, the contract with the private prison needs to ensure
access for official visitors, Ombudsmen’s right to oversee the operations, parliamentary
scrutiny and freedom of information. Notably, these things would be almost identical to the
monitoring rights of the community if the facilities were being managed by the public
sector, but in addition to these the contracts must ensure that an independent monitor is
appointed to check contract compliance and compliance with general standards. In order to
perform a monitoring task, the contracts that are being monitored need to be available,
however in many cases the “final contracts themselves are treated as being ‘commercial in
confidence’” (Harding, 1992, p.5). As noted earlier, the controversy surrounding public
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sector secrecy and a protracted legal battles using Freedom of Information legislation has
led the Western Australian and Victorian government to make available private prison
contracts to the public. Although this kind of openness is an essential part of accountability,
it is not enough in itself.

Monitoring the contract is essential to ensure that the service that has been defined and paid
for is actually being provided. Harding (1998) suggested that the monitoring of contracts
under the stated arrangements and within the organisational cultural contexts provides a
situation that is open to regulatory capture. This sections opening statement by Richard
Harding (Haultain, 1997) on the Junee Prison riots provides an example of regulatory
failure, as the Correction Service Commission of New South Wales had not persisted with
the on-site full-time monitor provided for in the contract. Instead they had withdrawn that
person from the system, leaving Junee prison without a person equipped to monitor the
operations properly. There are a number of examples of this ‘capture’ within contractual
arrangements. One such example is the Borallon prison in Queensland, which was
supposed to have a monitor on site five days per week. This person was directly
responsible to the Queensland Corrective Services Commission (QCSC). When
interviewed a year after the opening of the prison, the monitor was spending one day per
week at the site as the person had become responsible for the monitoring of five sites
(Moyle, 1994). Harding (1998) suggested that this process was the result of resource
constraints and neither a corporate or government organisational culture that was
supportive of the need for monitoring, making it difficult for the monitor to access the
information and resources to fulfil the obligations of the role. In this way, the contracting
out decision may service the needs of both the private operator and the government, as
neither have had to maintain the monitoring standard required previously – and both have
been able to blame each other for the inadequacies.
Although the accountability mechanisms may appear sound within the contract, the
practicalities are never as clearly represented (Funnell, 2001). This is a point that has been
clearly made by Cavise, when he argued that
(i)f the interests of society and the rights of the individual are to be safeguarded,
the "government of the people" is under an obligation to ensure that the goals of
incarceration are met by the constant control and monitoring exercised by a state
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agency that is not motivated by profit but by societal and individual concerns
(1998, p.20).

It has been suggested that if the contract is sound, it can provide strict safeguards in terms
of specification of standards, default, penalty, termination and step-in clauses. According to
Harding, “(a) loose contract will tend to have loose accountability; a tighter one should
facilitate accountability” (1998, p.80). However, as the Borallon and Junee example
suggest, contracted and actual accountability may be significantly different. All this may
enable us to forget that we are talking about accountability in and for prisons, which has a
moral and social responsibility beyond the technical (in)accuracies of a contract. As
Shearer has argued “any theory of moral responsibility must ultimately rest on ethical
considerations regarding the nature of the economic entity, including its relationship to the
human community within which it operates” (Shearer, 2002, p.543).

IV. Contract Awarding, Renewal and Termination

The process of awarding, renewing and terminating contracts must enable the government
to hold the contractor accountable for their actions and also should allow the community to
have input as to the acceptability of the contractual arrangement (Scott, 1996; Schoombee,
1997). Unfortunately, this has proven difficult in Australia as the tendering and renewal
process has not encouraged the kind of competition that is supposed to lead to better
outcomes. This is particularly true in the case of contract renewal, wherein many of the
contracts allow the current operating company the right to the contract over other operators
in the industry.

There are a variety of possible contractual arrangements between government and the
private contractor, from purely outsourcing the administration of prisons, to contracting out
design and construction of the prisons, to full ownership and financing of the complete
prison arrangement. There have been considerable investigations into the mixture that is
the most cost effective, whilst maintaining the minimum quality required (Logan, 1990).
According to Harding (1998) there has been considerable take up of the model that ensures
private contractors, or their financiers, have paid for and own the prison structure itself,
with the government repaying the capital and borrowing costs over time. At the expiry of
this, the private contractor continues to own the structure and has a further twenty-year
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lease of the land. These contracts also come with initial five-year management contracts
with three-year renewal periods. This arrangement has been adopted heavily in Victoria,
leading Harding to question how accountability can be maintained within these contractual
arrangements as it “gives the owner/operator a powerful position in bidding for the
continuance of the initial contract” (1998, p. 2). As the “loss of a management contract to a
competitor” is an “important element in effective accountability” this is “unlikely”
(Harding, 1998, p.2). Currently in Australia, Borallon, Arthur Gorrie and Mt Gambier are
‘management only’ contracts; Woodford and Junee are ‘design, construct and
management’ contracts; with Victoria’s Deer Park, Fulham and Port Phillip being the only
fully privatised prisons.

The private ownership of prison buildings and land may present a serious issue to
governments if they choose to take back the administration of prison services. As the
ability to reclaim the administration of the prison is an integral part of the accountability
process, these ownership and control issues could erode the ‘actual’ existence of
appropriate accountability mechanisms. Harding has argued that
(d)eferred ownership of real estate and physical plant and long-term financial
commitment by way of certificates of participation together constitute real if not
insuperable barriers to state policy reversal in this area (1997, p.13).

There are many examples of State governments failing to step in when companies have
breached their contracts. For instance, the Prison Privatisation Report International (PPRI)
reported in May 2003, that the Inspector General of Corrective Services for NSW
commented on ACM’s management of the Junee Correctional Centre, stating that “there
appear to be a number of ongoing areas where the contractor and the department (of
corrective services) have disagreed in terms of service delivery, but these matters never
seem to be resolved. Nevertheless the department continues to find the contractor
satisfactorily meets its contractual obligations” (PPRI, May 2003).

During a lockdown in Port Phillip prison operated by Group 4 in May 2003, a pistol,
ammunition, drugs, mobile phones and a digital camera were found in prison cells. As the
government did not step in, there was considerable community concern surrounding the
“imbalance of power in the contracts between the government and Victoria’s two private
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prison operators” (PPRI, June 2003). PPRI drew attention to an interview with Andre
Haermeyer on ABC Radio in which he said “we have contractual obligations and it is only
when there is a serious and repeated material default against the contract that we can
actually step in” and when asked whether a loaded gun constituted such a breach he replied
“well, no, it isn’t, under the contract, no…” (PPRI, June 2003). In fact, the contracts for
this prison and Fulham (run by Group 4) was renewed in October 2002 with what the
government described as ‘tighter performance measures’, however, this was not part of a
competitive retendering process because the initial contract gave these operators first rights
to new contracts.

The difficulties faced by governments when they decide to reverse the decision to privatise
or contract out has been evidenced in the case of the Metropolitan Women’s Correctional
Centre in Victoria, where the government has faced community concern about the cost of
the reversal. Even though the situation at the MWCC was revealed to be in breach of the
contract, the decision to terminate the contract was not easy. With the return of MWCC to
public control in 2000, this situation arose after 4 years of repeated breaches of contract
and failure to meet the service delivery outcomes required.

However, there was little precedence for such a situation and the conditions of that return
were complicated and negotiations were protracted. In the end, the state of Victoria was
forced to purchase the building from the contractor. Acknowledging the breaches the
contractor requested a negotiated settlement of the contractual arrangements, which meant
that the state of Victoria was not exposed to extended litigation. In November 2000, the
Government took back ownership and management of the prison for $20.2 million, $17.8
million of which was for the building, infrastructure and chattels and $2.4 covered the costs
of terminating the loan on the facility that had been taken out by the private operator
(Auditor General – Victoria, 2001). The Auditor General – Victoria (2001) identified that
$1.2 million of these costs were specifically related to the step-in and administration of the
facility.

These indicate the costs that are not considered when a contracting out or privatisation
decision is made and is indicative of the ideologically driven cost data that is produced in
order to justify privatisation decisions. As a result of the complexities of the contracting
process, it is hard to hold the government or the private operator accountable for their
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actions. As Robinson (2003, p.184) pointed out “reports generated through performance
measurement initiatives were supposed to give the voting public a way to see how
responsible and accountable their government had become. But the presence of such
unintended consequences might inspire us to consider the following idea: scientific
knowledge can be used as a weapon”. Perhaps an extension of this would be to say that in
light of neoliberal ideology, these consequences may benefit both the government and the
private prison operator as they produce the appearance of accountability whilst distorting
its meaning in fundamental ways that enable a retreat from responsibility (Funnell, 2001).

Ethical Accountability and Prison Profits
Frank Vincent: The State creates the offences, imposes the sanctions, enforced the
law, and then either incarcerates individuals or subjects them to community-based
orders of one kind or another. The whole process is an activity of the State, and for
the purposes of the State, and it makes no sense then that the State would not be
central to it. It must be realised that at the end of the day that what is being exercised
is a considerable amount of power in relation to individuals (Haultain, 1997).

In the previous section it has been established that even a procedural view of accountability
is difficult to ensure, but even if it was easy, it is still insufficient as it fails to ground our
ideas of accountability within a “substantive moral framework” (Lehman, 2005, p.976). As
Lehman (2005, p.985) has argued “(i)t remains problematic whether procedural
conceptions of accountability expand our understanding of citizenship” instead, it is
possible that “people the atoms that make a market system work”.

Along with this, it is important to acknowledge that accountability within the prison sector
has important ethical dimensions, the removal of a persons right to participate in society is
a significant State power and public support because of its moral intent. This intent can’t be
discharged by a ‘check the box’ style accountability arrangement, as the State, the
community, the ‘prison provider’ and the ‘criminals’ moral responsibility is more
substantive than immediate, measurable outcomes would lead us to believe. In this section,
two issues will be explored in order to illustrate the centrality of ethics, when discussing
public accountability for prisons. Firstly, the quasi-judicial powers of prisons mean that
corporations could have a substantial affect on the length and type of punishment that a
28

person may endure; and secondly, there are considerable socio-political and ethical
questions surrounding the future of a society that sanctions a connection between profit and
punishment. As Shichor argued “instrumental goals are usually clear, consistent and easily
quantifiable, on the other hand, the goals of human service organisations are harder to
quantify, their level of performance does not lend itself to easy evaluation” (1998, p.89).

I. The Quasi-Judicial Powers of Prisons

When addressing issues of moral responsibility and prison management, the outsourcing of
prisons has been justified on claims that the sentence and the administration of that
sentence can be clearly separated (Harding, 1992). However there are a number of
problems with this, particularly in regard to ‘quasi-legal’ decisions that are made within
prisons themselves. These are made with little outside arbitration or scrutiny and in some
cases there is no outside arbitration at all. This means that prison management does have
the ability to affect the way that the sentence is administered, and has some ability to
significantly change the experience of that sentence as a result of internal decisions,
particularly in the case of alleged breaches of prison discipline. In these cases, the hearing
and review process often occurs entirely within a correctional centre (Moyle, 1999),
drawing into question the ability for private sector management to make credible,
uninterested decisions, about the treatment of prisoners. Moyle (1994) attended a number
of hearings at Borallon and Lotus Glen in Queensland, and some of the transcripts illustrate
the lack of scrutiny within internal hearings. He outlined the position of Manager of
Operations (MO) at the Borallon prison saying
it was acceptable to breach inmates because they were a “problem at the centre”.
The MO clarified the meaning of “problem at the centre” as “protecting CCA’s
business name” (Moyle, 1999, p.166).

This is not an isolated incident. In Queensland, the private company ACM runs the
reception centre at Arthur Gorrie. At this facility, all the decisions about the prisoner’s
classification as a maximum/medium/minimum security inmate are made. It goes without
saying that these will seriously affect the movement of a prisoner through the correctional
system, and although there are regulations that guide this decision making process there is,
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in practice, extensive discretion to be exercised on behalf of the classification staff. When
Moyle interviewed a sentence classification officer at ACM in 1997, they gave an example:
“Here is an inmate who is a serious sex offender. We have to look at presentation,
appearance, behaviour, mood, what he is thinking and his employment history.
We should get a psychologist to do this but because of a shortage we have a
teacher doing it. I shouldn’t tell you that. The recommendation should not be
made by a teacher…We know it’s not their place” (Moyle, 1999, p. 169).

This decision making process has serious consequences for the person about to enter the
correctional system as it will affect the ‘type’ of sentence they will have to undergo.
Moyle’s (1999) paper argued that the fact that a private facility was able to make these
decisions meant that they might have the opportunity to choose ‘profitable’ or ‘cheap’
prisoners (Harding, 1998 also outlines this possibility). Private management can also
exercise quasi-judicial powers by placing a prisoner in solitary confinement, which is a
practice that amounts to punishment and it does not have to be sanctioned directly by the
State. At the Acacia prison in Western Australia, AIMS corporation came under criticism
from the Inspector General, Richard Harding when he discovered that there was evidence
that “some inmates had been locked in their cell, with the electricity off as a form of
punishment” (PPRI, May 2003).

According to Moyle, these internal “disciplinary regimes involve an extension of state
authority” (1999, p. 172). Russell voiced concern over these arrangements when he wrote
(p)rivate prisons can directly affect remission, parole, disciplinary decisions and a
number of other issues which potentially increase the length of sentence of an
inmate and some these matters are not subject to review or appeal (1997, p.8).

The fact that private companies, primarily answerable to their shareholders, can make
decisions about prisoners that go beyond administration, undermines the government’s
argument that a prison sentence can be managed by a private entity. It is obvious that the
quasi judicial powers of prison management impinge on the government’s ultimate
responsibility to determine the punishment of the person. It also complicates the public
accountability process as the punisher is further removed from the society in whose name
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the punishment is being carried out. The affect of profiting from punishment on public
accountability will be considered in the following section.

II. Profiting From Punishment

As punishment is complex social, ideological and cultural terrain, it will never be an
entirely rational execution of orders with clear objectives and controllable outcomes. It is
has multiple and competing aims and innumerable intended and unintended consequences.
In accordance with this Garland has argued “(t)he failure of modern punishment is in part
the inevitable outcome of an over rationalized conception of its functions” (1991, p.12). As
prisons enable a society to separate and classify those that it deems to be ‘criminal’, the
introduction of privately operated prisons further separates criminals from society because
of the shifts this enables in terms of public accountability. In light of this, the ability for a
private corporation to profit from nuanced state and social objectives acted out on the body
of a citizen could be considered unreasonable and morally repugnant. By no means is it
surprising that corporations will act to minimise costs, and cost is an obvious consideration
in the delivery of any public sector function but the centrality of cost and the possibility of
profit are problematic. Prisons and penal policy should be focused on broader social
objectives and questions that lead to better outcomes for all members of a society,
including prisoners, as has been shown, these questions are not enabled within the current
accountability arrangements. This is a view supported by Shearer (2002, p.546) who
argued that “when economic entities render accounts of themselves in economic terms, the
identity so portrayed and the obligations of the entity with respect to the broader
community are both dependent upon the specific conceptions of subjectivity and
intersubjectivity that are instantiated by economic discourse”

It has been argued throughout this paper that imprisonment has an undeniable moral
component, as punishment imposes deprivation and suffering on a citizen as a result of
them breaking the law. According to Ryan and Ward, it should be remembered that
punishment represents “organized use of force in liberal democratic states” (1989, p. 70)
which means there is a huge scope for abuse in this process by both private and public
agencies. They argued that it is morally repugnant to punish people for profit because it
creates a link between pain and suffering, and profits. For them it is not punishment that is
the problem, but the socio-political message sent via “the rewards that accrue to penal
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entrepreneurs” (1989, p.70). It is also possible that these rewards may create a prison
industrial complex, in which there is a vested interest in prison expansion (Stern, 1998).
This would suggest that there are profound ethical and ideological issues surrounding the
privatisation of prisons, yet these have been ignored largely in favour of discussions
regarding cost-effectiveness, comparative costs and value for money – all strong indicators
of a government driven by neoliberal ideology (both Logan, 1990 and Calabrese, 1993
discuss this in detail). It is difficult to accept the argument that problems associated with
the private/public sector split of responsibilities can be overcome with effective
accountability, because the accountability proposed is highly technical, rational and
objective, disconnected from the moral and ethical dimensions present within
accountability relationship. As has been argued by Freiberg
(t)he provision of correctional services carries with it greater responsibilities and
unusual requirements of accountability than most other areas of government
services. Because prisons are concerned with the liberty of individuals, issues of
authority, legitimacy, procedural justice, liability and corruptibility must play a
major role in their management (1999, p.122).

Questions about the quality and purpose of corrections services must be central to the
debate, which has led Russell to argue that
private prisons should be opposed fundamentally because of the inferior quality of
services prisoners receive as a result of the insatiable drive to increase the profit
margin in such institutions (1997, p.7).

As has been suggested, the boundaries between the allocation and administration of
punishment are also complicated within a private prison system as the prison operator does
have many discretionary powers that can affect the length and type of incarceration that the
prisoner experiences (Ryan and Ward, 1989; Moyle, 1999). This is also true of public
prisons, but when a corporation who is ultimately bound by corporation law to maximise
returns to shareholders is responsible for such decision making, keeping prison beds filled
and the industry growing is essential to the growth potential of the company. This may lead
to a situation in which “doing well beats doing good” (Smith, 1993) in the corrections
industry. There is substantial evidence of this within the industry, for instance the Inspector
General’s report on the Acacia prison in Western Australia highlighted this when he
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discovered that “quantities of food seemed to have diminished as population increased, as
if the same sized cake were being divided more times” (PPRI, May 2003).
This is a view supported by Hallet who claimed that combining privatising aspects of the
corrections system has enabled a solution to over-crowded and costly prisons that leaves
the root cause of crime unaddressed, and “in this case, the fountain of all profits – large
populations of disenfranchised surplus population trapped in the inner city to be
incarcerated for non-violent drug crime – conveniently intact” (2002, p. 389). Instead of
communities demanding a form of accountability that highlights their elected officials
efforts to address root causes of crime, and information about a government’s efforts to
reduce behaviour that is deemed to be socially inappropriate, we are left with accounts of
how governments are reducing the costs of crime through privatisation. This is obviously in
the interests of those that profit from imprisonment, because if we were to begin to address
root causes, it is imaginable that the number of people going to jail would decrease and this
would have a corresponding negative impact on shareholder wealth of private corrections
companies. Overall, connecting profits to punishment means that there will be less
incentive to reduce rates of incarceration and enormous private resources will be mobilised
to ensure that prison policy does not deviate from a policy that continues to enrich private
interests (Chomsky, 1999). For Shichor even the potential “for conflict between the social
interests to reduce prison population, and the financial interests of private correctional
corporations to increase it” (1998, p.84) is too much and he argued that
(t)he logic and nature of corporations further the consistent drive toward expansion
and they will build a growth factor into the correctional system (Shichor, 1998,
p.86).

Conclusions

The dominance of neo-liberal ideology in post-industrial societies has meant that the prison
has not been left untouched by decision-making models founded on ‘economic
rationalism’. Chomsky (1999) has argued that this is part of a systematic effort to erode
democracy, which in his view benefits corporations and governments. Both are able to
distance themselves from the will of the people and act in ways that are mutually beneficial
to ensure expanding profits for corporations and a diminished citizenry for governments to
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have to respond to. The privatisation of prison management and prison building connects
punishment with profit, and although many argue that the sentence and the administration
of that sentence can be separated, this paper indicates that there are significant areas of
overlap. The expeditions of private capital into areas that have been off limits are indicative
of the crises that face the expansionist imperative of capitalism in economies that are no
longer industrially oriented. As capital looks for places to grow, public sector services are a
logical focus and prisons have not been left out of this process. Within the context of
private prison operations, effective accountability plays a vital role in order to provide the
conditions that enable the private provider, the state and citizens to scrutinise penal policy
and operations. Unfortunately, as this paper has shown, the technical mutations of
accountability have dominated these processes and it has also been argued that the
emphasis placed on procedural accountability has helped obfuscate the ethical and moral
components of accountability relationships.

The idea that profits can be derived from punishment presents our society with a
considerable ethical dilemma, and those opposed to such a relationship have often couched
this opposition in terms of the superiority of the state over the private sector. The difficulty
with this argument is that public prison systems are also riddled with problems, and a
debate that centres on the provider can fail to analyse the role of prisons and punishment
within society. Raising ethical accountability issues creates a level of complexity that can
be confusing and messy, but such issues can lead to deeper considerations of the inequities
that operate within our societies and the impact these have on criminality; the prejudices
that are institutionalised and the affect this has on the ways we define deviance and
illegality; the alienation experienced within post-industrial society and the corresponding
need to act out; and the ways that power operates to define the parameters of the acceptable
and unacceptable. It is in this way that punishment is both a social expression and an
instrument of social control, wherein discussions about the role of the state in sentence
administration can be a distraction from the deeper issues of economic, political and social
influence. Unfortunately, the technical mutations of accountability appear to have provided
a vehicle for such distraction.
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Table1: Private Prisons in Australia, 2003.
(Data provided by the Australian Institute for Criminology)

State

Name

Security Level

Size

Private Operator

Western Australia

Acacia

Medium(Male)

750

AIMS

Queensland

Arthur Gorrie

Max/Med/Min

710

ACM

(reception and remand)
Queensland

Borallon

Max/Med

492

MTC

Victoria

Fulham

Med/Min

777

ACM (GEO Group
Australia)

Victoria

Port Phillip

Max

710

Group 4 (GSL
Custodial Services)

NSW

Junee

Med/Min

600

ACM

South Australia

Mt Gambier

Med/Min

110

Group 4

Victoria

Metro Women’s

Max/Med/Min

125

CCA (1996-2000)
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1

Although it may appear that I accept the idea of the ‘criminal’ unproblematically, this is not the case.
Criminality and its connection to race, socio-economic opportunity and gender are acknowledged, but cannot
be explored in detail within this paper.
2
There is considerable historical debate about the role of private contractors in the penal system, with the
period between 1840 and 1960 providing many examples of private contractors involved in a variety of
correctional activities (Garland, 1990). Although this is true, ‘public sector’ services dominated the period. It
should also be noted that the shift to public management of prisons has not necessarily led to the outcomes
mentioned here.
3
This is the highest in the world on a percentage basis (Roth, 2004).
4
Funnell (2001) outlines an example in the United States where attempts to specify the requirements of a loaf
of bread led to the production of a 20 page document.
5
However, according to Chomsky (1999) it is “not new” and it is “not liberal”.
6
Under the Freedom of Information Act, you may be denied right of access to information where, there is a
legitimate need for confidentiality or where another person's privacy may be invaded. Under the legislation
the business affairs of another person or business are often exempt from claims under the Act.
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